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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. T. CHAMBERS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ \~ 
R. W. SIMS, 
Defend:;t and Appellant, ( No. 9554 
MARGARET S. CHAMBERS, ) 
Cross-Defendant and Respondent. 
J. T. CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant~ 
vs. 
R. ,iV. SIMS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 9556 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT R. W. SIMS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
It is clear that neither plaintiff J. T. Chambers nor 
defendant R. W. Sims agrees with the disposition of 
the case made by the District Court. Each of them has 
appealed from the judgment. 
The trial court attempted to create a contract for 
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which neither party contended at any itme, which is 
utterly inconsistent with the Certificate of Limited 
Partnership dated May 8, 1948, Exhibit 11-D, and 
contrary to the express contentions of the parties set 
forth in their Agreement for Dissolution of Partner-
ship dated August 17, 1959, Exhibit 10-D, and the 
admissions of Mr. and Mrs. Chambers. There was no 
consideration nor any meeting of the minds of the 
partners for such judicially created "implied contract" 
for "reasonable compensation for the services of plain-
tiff" and "no compensation for services of defendant." 
While defendant disagrees with most of the content 
of the Brief of Plaintiff J. T. Chambers, defendant 
concurs in that pottion of plaintiff's contention on page 
39 which states that "it was error for the Court to con-
sider further evidence on the issue of reasonableness." 
Before the introduction ofany evidence it was expressly 
agreed between the court and counsel that '""the matter 
of reasonableness is not an issue in the case.-"' The judg-
ment assailed on this appeal is chiefly predicated on 
such error of the trial court. Plaintiff seeks the benefit 
of such admitted error. Plaintiff complains that the trial 
court "only went half way." 
Plaintiff's contentions in his brief are contrary to 
the record and contrary to law, as this reply brief is 
designed to illustrate. 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO CONTROVERT 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Brief of Plaintiff does not comply with Rule 
7 5 ( p) ( 2) which requires a respondent, if he controverts 
appellant's statement of facts, to "state wherein such 
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statement is inconsistent with the facts" and to "make 
a statemenet of the facts as he finds them, giving refer-
ence to the pages of the record supporting his statement 
and contraverting appellant's statement." 
Counsel for plaintiff does not point out any error 
in the Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of 
Defendant and Appellant R. W. Sims. Plaintiff at-
tempts to brush aside all of the essential facts including 
the fatal admissions of plaintiff and cross-defendant by 
saying that "The Statement of Facts made by appellant 
at pages 2 to 10 is rejected in its entirety." Plaintiff 
says that defendant "ignores the evidence of plaintiff," 
but does not say what evidence. Most of the facts stated 
by defendant are those which came from the lips of 
plaintiff John T. Chambers and cross-defendant Mar-
garet S. Chambers, his wife, or facts which were cor-
roborated by their solemn admissions. 
Instead of making any statement of ,facts, on page 
5 of his brief plaintiff says that "The facts before this 
Court are primarily those stated by the court in its 
memorandum decisions and found by the court in its 
findings of fact." VVe disagree. While the trial court 
made some correct findings, the court based most of its 
findings on incompetent evidence, disregarded the ad-
mitted agreements between plaintiff and defendant, the 
express admissions of plaintiff and his wife, and most 
of the other undisputed evidence including the stipu-
lations of counsel. We take no issue with the cases cited 
on page 6 of the Brief of Plaintiff. Those cases, however, 
do not even suggest that findings of fact can be predi-
cated on incompetent evidence, nor that the court can 
refuse to make findings in accordance with the undis-
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puted competent and material evidence, nor create a 
new contract for the parties which was incompatible with 
all of their agreements and discussions, nor make some 
findings which are directly contrary to the evidence, 
as occurred in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO SALARY HAVING BEEN PAID TO 
EITHER PARTNER, THERE WAS NO 
"PRACTICE OF PAYMENT," AND THERE 
COULD NOT ARISE ANY "IMPLIED CON-
TRACT TO PAY COMPENSATION TO 
PLAINTIFF AND DENY COMPENSATION 
TO DEFEND.i\..NT. 
This is not a case where a salary has ever been paid 
to either partner. This case is not in point at all with 
the line of cases which holds that where a salary has 
regularly been paid by the partners to one of the part~ 
ners over a long period of time, an agreement can be 
implied from such established practice to pay such 
salary to such partner. Plaintiff cites some cases involv-
ing payment of salary to a partner, and then on page 
16 of his brief claims that Shulkin v. ShulkinJ 301 Mass. 
184, 16 N.E. 2d 644, 118 A.L.R. 629, "is similar to the 
principal case." That case involved a long practice of 
regular salary paJpments to partners other than the 
complaining partner. The complaining partner ad-
mitted there was an agreement for payment of salaries 
to the other partners, and he acknowledged that he had 
actual notice of salary payments, but he claimed he was 
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not aware of the precise amount. lie said he understood 
that the other partners "were to draw enough to live on." 
The Shulkin case as quite dissimilar. 
The controversy in this case arises over the un-
authorized undisclosed bookkeeping entries and omis-
sions made by plaintiff's wife, none of which entries 
were ever paid either prior to dissolution, nor under 
the Agreement for Dissolution of Partnership dated 
August 17, 1959, Exhibit 10-D. By said agreement 
the plaintiff and defendant stipulated on a tentative 
equal division of the assets but no payment of salary 
to either partner, subject to the right of each partner 
to an accounting and a right to litigate their disputed 
claims. 
Plaintiff does not cite any competent evidence to 
support his contention of a "practice" by the partners, 
but merely refers to the erroneous Finding of Fact 
No.7 whereby the trial court declared that "the practice 
was established, of which defendant had reasonable 
notice, of compensating plaintiff for full-time services, 
and allowing defendant nothing for his services to the 
partnership ... " (R. 185-186. Ab. 320-322). The 
term "compensate" means to "remunerate" or to "pay." 
There is not only a lack of any competent evidence of 
payment of any salary to either general partner, but 
the evidence is conclusive that no salary was paid at any 
time to either Mr. Sims or to Mr. Chambers. 
Although Mrs. Chambers issued nearly all of the 
checks over a period of nearly 12 years, at no time dur-
ing the operation of the partnership nor under the 
agreement for dissolution of the partnership was any 
check ever issued either to John T. Chambers or 
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to R. W. Sims for "salary" or remuneration for 
services." Mrs. Chambers testified that "various sums 
of money" were paid at "various times at irregular 
intervazsn to Mr. Sims and to Mr.Chambers upon re-
quest, just as they needed money. (R. 691, 974-978. 
Ab. 77, 110). She said "There was no regular with-
drawals or payments made to either partner"; that bills 
were paid out of the partnership bank account for each 
of the partners; and that payments were made "just as 
each partner needed money": 
Q. And that was true with respect to each of the 
partners? 
A. That's right. 
Q. So there was never any pattern set up as to a 
certain amount being ·withdrawn even for 
your own salary on a particular date, was 
there? 
A. That's right. (R. 722-723. Ab. 83). 
The J. T. Chambers memorandum "capital ac-
count" sheet now appearing in the ledger, Exhibit 1-P, 
on which the unauthorized "salary" entries appear, 
was not prepared until1955, and the "blue worksheets" 
which previously appeared "were thrown away." Such 
changes were made by Mr. Evans on instructions from 
Mrs. Chambers. (R. 1188-1193. Ab. 143). Mrs. Cham-
bers admitted that the "salary" entries for her husband 
which appear in the ledger, and the omission of salary 
entries for Mr. Sims were her own decisions and made 
without instructions from or consultation with either 
partner, and that she never told Mr. Sims about them; 
that those entries had gone on for a period of years 
"before there was any discovery made of those entries'' 
' 
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and when Mr. Sims found out about them he became 
very angry. (R. 715, 721. Ab. 82-83). 
Counsel for the Chambers at the opening of trial 
admitted that those "salary" entries were never paid. 
Neither partner ever reported on his Federal or State 
income tax that he had ever been paid a "'salaryn by 
the partnership. It appears that all of the entries were 
made either during or since 1955, and some entries 
were back-dated to prior years. As pointed out here-
after, neither partner found out about those unauthor-
ized, secret, undisclosed "salary" entries at least until 
October 1958. Consequently, the argument of plaintiff 
that there was a "practice of compensating" .J. T. 
Chambers for full-time services, and a practice of the 
partners not to compensate R. W. Sims, is not only 
misleading, but it disputes the record. Furthermore 
statements that Chambers was "allowed" the "salaries" 
shown in the books, when neither partner knew about 
them, are also unfounded, for they could not be "al-
lowed" by the partners until they knew about them 
and until both approved them, which never occurred. 
On page 13 of his brief plaintiff makes the un-
founded argument that the court held that "the book-
keeping entries established the salaries" and inferen-
tially established a right to the unauthorized salaries 
noted in the records, "except for the confidential rela-
tionship existing between the cross-defendant and de-
fendant, which required a more complete and specific 
disclosure than the acquiescence or adoption which 
resulted from general practices." As illustrated under 
Points 3 and 4 of this Reply Brief there was neither a 
plea nor proof nor finding of any "acquiescence or 
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adoption"; and the unauthorized entries appearing in 
the books were not the practices of the partners. The 
court found by Finding of Facts No. 10 that there was 
not sufficient disclosure of the salary entries made by 
Mrs. Chambers in favor of her husband to become bind-
ing on defendant Sims. Consequently, the finding 
necessarily implies that the entries were unauthorized 
and that such unauthorized entries did not establish 
salary for Chambers on the books. Furthermore, plain-
tiff overlooks the fact that only the partners themselves 
had any authority to establish partners' salaries, and 
that neither the plaintiff's wife nor a bookkeeper could 
divest the partners of that right. 
As pointed out by the New York Court of Appeals 
in Aron v. Gillman, 309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E. 2d 284, 
287, parties are not bound by incorrect figures appearing 
in the books: 
"Thus the very purpose of an audit is to verify 
and reconcile the book entries of a business ac-
cording to proper accounting practice, and to 
see that they are accurate ... 
" ... Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that we 
should take the inventory figure at $12,001.15 
simply because it is the figure appearing on the 
books, and despite the fact that it is concededly 
erroneous. We are not obliged to follow blindly 
entries in books that are indisputably untrue .. " 
The same applies to. entries which are unauthorized. 
It could not be successfully argued that unauthorized 
entries are correct entries. 
Plaintiff purportedly filed this suit for a "partner-
ship accounting," as permitted by law and as permitted 
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by Exhibit 10-D, the Agreement for Dissolution of 
Partnership, dated August 17, 1959; but the purpose 
of the action by plaintiff was not partnership account-
ing at all, for plaintiff has never attempted to comply 
with the principles or rules of partnership accounting 
which require a party who claims a credit to prove that 
he is entitled to the credit he claims. Instead, plaintiff 
actually filed this action to reap the unearned benefits 
of unauthorized secret salary entries made in favor of 
plaintiff by his wife, and to reap the benefit of the 
omission of any salary entries for the defendant Sims. 
Plaintiff never did prove that he was entitled to the 
salary entries, for his own proof conclusively established 
the fact that they were unauthorized by the partners 
and that the entries and omissions were the bookkeeping 
manipulations caused by plaintiff's wife in violation 
of her fiduciary duties to her trusting brother R. W. 
Sims. 
Plaintiff's so-called "accounting" is not in evi-
dence. Plaintiff's accountant, David N. Beal, pur-
ported to make an "audit" at the request of Mrs. Cham-
bers in 1955, and again in 1960. His testimony shows 
that he did not attempt to "verify and reconcile the 
book entries" or "to see that they are accurate." He 
testified that he "assumed" that the entries were correct. 
He even "assumed" that "salaries" had been "paid." 
He even assumed the functions of a lawyer to "inter-
pret" the Certificate of Limited Partnership, and did 
not even bother to find out about the agreeme~s from 
the partners. (R. 306, 331. ____ -------- Ab. 18, 22). Mr. 
Beal admitted that he found thousands of dollars in 
errors in the records including "net errors in overstated 
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income of $38,000." (R. 335-336. Ab. 22-23). He 
identified many errors noted in the defendant's ac-
counting Exhibit 5-D, and said that Glendon E. Steiner 
prepared Exhibit 5-D after the two of them had gone 
over the records together. (R. 332-334. Ab. 22). As 
shown by his pleading, plaintiff sought to recover the 
unpaid unauthorized salary entries appearing in the 
J. T. Chambers memorandum capital account. 
The only accounting in evidence is defendant's 
accounting, Exhibit 5-D. With respect to the salary 
items, Mr. Steiner testified that he verified those figures 
from the deposition of Mr. and Mrs. Chambers and 
information furnished by Mr. Sims that on May 8, 
1948, the partners agreed on n1onthly salaries of $400 
for R. W. Sims and $350 for J. T. Chambers and that 
said agreement was never changed. ( R. 1343-1347. 
Ab. 161). While plaintiff now tries to dispute the 
veracity of his own statements given on deposition, and 
the trial court found that the salary "arrangement" of 
$400 for Sims and $350 for Chambers "never became 
operative," by the pretrial order and by Exhibit 3-P 
the plaintiff acknowledged the correctness of the sum 
of $2,507.16 as the ba]ance due to Mary Lois Fors as 
heir-at-law to the limited partner L. H. Sims. As shown 
in Exhibit 5-D, the only way that figure could possibly 
be computed was to recognize the agreed monthly sal-
aries of $400 for Sims and $350 for Chambers. By im-
plication, at least, the plaintiff and cross-defendant 
acknowledged that those figures 'vere right for purposes 
of determining the unpaid capital account of Mary Lois 
Fors. While plaintiff concedes that the defendant's 
accounting is correct for ascertaining the amount due 
10 
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and owing to i\lrs. Fors, plaintiff seeks to dispute the 
premises for such determination and to claim the benefit 
of the unauthorized salary entries, which is strange 
reasoning indeed. 
Counsel for plaintiff "grasps for straws" in citing 
Federal Revenue cases which hold that every partner 
is charged with knowing what is on the partnership 
records and what is omitted from the records. The 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 charges each partner 
with such knowledge, for tax purposes only. Plaintiff 
avoids mentioning that all of the partnership returns 
were signed by J. T. Chambers and none of them by 
R. W. Sims, so that Sims could not be charged with 
actual knowledge of the gross errors or inconsistencies 
or fictitious profits. 
Since there is no evidence of any "practice of the 
partners" to "recognize claims for salaries," it is diffi-
cult to understand why plaintiff refers to paragraph 6 
of his complaint which alleges that "The practice of 
the partners has been to recognize claims for services" 
either by a-making payment or giving credit therefor~ 
and thereafter to divide net profits equally between 
plaintiff and defendant." (R. 2, 1760. Ab. 230). If 
there was a valid agreement between the general part-
ners for salaries, neither partner had any occasion to 
make any "claim" to a bookkeeper or to any other 
employee. Furthermore, a "claim for salary" would 
require the claimant to state a specific amount, which 
would be inconsistent with the trial court's disposition 
of the case by allowing "reasonable compensation" to 
plaintiff and "denial of compensation" to defendant. 
Since there was no payment of any salary, there was 
11 
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no "practice of making payment" of "claims for salary." 
Plaintiff did not know he was ever credited with any 
salary until1959. That was after this controversy arose. 
Plaintiff made no claim for any of the unauthorized 
salary entries appearing in the records until July 1959. 
This is not a case where one partner devotes his 
full time to the business and acts as "managing partner" 
and the other partner devotes no time to the business. 
In this case both partners rendered personal services, 
and Sims was the recognized "head of the company" 
and Mr. Chambers testified that it was agreed on May 
8, 1948, that "every important decision should be re-
ferred to" Sims. (R. 886. Ab. 103). It was admitted 
that Sims never violated his agreements. (R. 279-280. 
Ab. 15). Nor is this case like two of the cases referred 
to in the Brief of Plaintiff where a partner says he will 
not perform his services to the partnership unless he 
receives compensation for his services. Mr. Chambers 
could not have rendered services in reliance on being 
paid the unauthorized salary entries made in his memo-
randum capital account when he said he did not know 
about those entries. 
Counsel for plaintiff points to no competent evi-
dence which could possibly show an "implied agree-
ment" to compensate plaintiff for his service and deny 
defendant compensation for his services. The rule is 
that an implied agreemnt that one partner should re-
ceive compensation for his services must be established 
by clear and satisfactory evidence. See Baker v. Mc-
Grane_, 198 Wis. 512, 224 N.,V. 737. 
The trial court erroneously treated the violation 
12 
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of Mrs. Chambers' fiduciary duties in making the un-
authorized entries in favor of her husband as the very 
basis for the abortive "implied agreement" to allow 
plaintiff "reasonable compensation" and to deny de-
fendant any cmnpensation except what Mrs. Chambers 
as an employee arbitrarily decided to "allow" her em-
ployer. 
POINT 2. 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT PROOF 
THATTHEPARTNERSEVERCONSENTED 
TO ANY MODIFICATION OF THEIR 
AGREEMENTS OR EVER AGREED ON AN 
UNEQUAL DIVISION OF PROFITS. 
Point I of plaintiff's brief states: "PARTNER-
SHIP AGREEMENTS lVIAY BE MODIFIED 
BY IMPLIED AGREEMENT OR ACQUIES-
CENCE." We are not concerned with some academic 
question whether partners can modify their agreement. 
The question is, Did the partners (as distinguished 
from a bookkeeper or some other employee) decide on 
modification of the partnership agreements? If they 
did, how, when and in what particulars did the partner.~ 
actually accomplish a modification? 
Before introduction of any evidence, the trial judge 
summarized plaintiff's contention that "the practice 
has so modified the original agreement that there is in 
effect little of the original agreement to guide us." 
Planitiff's counsel approved that statement. (R. 281. 
Ab. IO). It was conceded by the court that "an un-
authorized act of a bookkeeper is not binding upon the 
13 
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partners." (R. 285. Ab. 12). Since plaintiff inferred 
an "adoption" by the partners, the court correctly held 
that in order to have an "adoption" by the partner.Y 
it "must be concurred in by both partners." (R. 282. 
Ab. 11). 
Throughout his brief plaintiff makes repeated argu-
ments to the effect that the partnership agreement was 
"modified by the practice," but none of the citations 
to the record show that the partners ever decided on any 
modification. Instead of offering evidence of "modifi-
cation" by the partners of their agreements, plaintiff 
merely presented evidence of unauthorized undisclosed 
acts and omissions of plaintiff's wife, who was the trusted 
record-keeper. 
Sub-point "A" of Point I of plaintiff's brief is 
that aThe Partnership Agreement of May 8, 1948, 
provides for compensation before division of profits.-'-' 
Compensation to whom? On page 13 plaintiff argues 
that "reasonable under the circumstances" "as provided 
in Paragraph XII of the Limited Partnership Agree-
ment is the agreement of the parties upon which the 
trial court relied." The court did not .follow Paragraph 
XII at all, but contradicted the express language 
thereof by Finding of Fact No. 11: "Paragraphs XII 
and XIII of the partnership agreement contemplate 
reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for his services 
to the partnership." The court also created an "implied 
agreement" of "reasonable compensation for plaintiff" 
and "no compensation for defendant" except such 
amount as plaintiff's wife had decided to "allow" him. 
Paragraph XII quoted on page 12 of plaintiff's 
14 
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brief does not state that "plaintiff shall be entitled to 
reasonable compensation" nor that "defendant shall 
be denied compensation.'' It states that the general 
partners (defendant and plaintiff) "shall be entitled 
to compensate themselves for their services as an ex-
pense of operation of the business before computation 
of profits.n It requires both general partners to deter-
Inine the amount of their compensation. If they desired 
compensation for their services, they were required to 
compensate themselves as an expense of operation of 
the business, and it had to be done in any accounting 
period before profits were computed. Otherwise such 
compensation could not have been used as an expense, 
nor used in computation of profits. The agreement did 
not say "reasonable compensation to be determined by 
the court." It specified that the partners might com-
pensate themselves, but as a protection to the limited 
partner it limited them "to the extent that such com-
pensation ... is reasonable under the circumstances." 
On page 19 of his brief plaintiff makes the un-
founded charge that "Defendant has attempted to 
distort the testimony" of both Mr. and Mrs. Chambers 
with respect to the subject of monthly salary of $400 
for Sims and $350 for Chambers. Plaintiff also argues: 
"The Court found that there was a conversa-
tion on May 8, 1948, at which salaries of $400.00 
and $350.00 per month were discussed. Mr. 
Chambers testified that his conversation took 
place months earlier when Exhibit 20-P was pre-
pared for Farmers State Bank (R. 899), and 
he didn't ever testify that the amounts agreed to 
were $400.00 and $350.00 ... " 
Plaintiff did not testify that the discussion of $400 
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per month for Sims and $350 for Chambers took place 
d " "months earlier when Exhibit 20-P was prepare · 
Upon interrogation by his counsel at the trial 
plaintiff Chambers testified: "I do not now recall any 
conversation between me and Mr. Sims of $400 a month 
for Mr. Sims and $350 a month for me." (R. 937. Ab. 
107-108). He admitted that on deposition February 
27, 1960, he did testify that there was a discussion about 
salaries on May 8, 1948 "in order to compute or deter-
mine the profit or the portion of the profit that L. H. 
Sims would be entitled to receive." Chambers acknowl-
edged that it wa~ agreed that he would receive a salary 
of $350 per month and R. W. Sims would receive a 
salary of $400 a month. Chambers also volunteered, 
"His [Sims'] was higher," and he admitted that Sims' 
agreed salary was $50 per month higher than Chambers' 
salary. Plaintiff said, "Yes, I agreed to it." He fur-
ther admitted that it was the "only salary agreement" 
ever made with respect to the partnership. (R. 874. 
Ab. 101). Mr. Chambers then stated that the book-
keepers (not the partners) later "changed" that agree-
ment, but he testified that "he never said anything to 
the bookkeepers about salaries." (R. 787. Ab. 102). 
Although Mr. Chambers read over his deposition with 
his attorney and made corrections to other portions of 
his deposition, he never corrected the quoted portions. 
(R. 875. A b. 101). 
On further interrogation by Mr. Bird, plaintiff 
represented to the court that he was"threatened" at the 
time of taking the deposition. (R. 936. Ab. 107). 
Chambers later admitted that the purported "threaten-
ing remark by Mr. Sims" did not occur during his depo-
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sition, but a weelt: after it was concluded. (R. 966-969). 
A b. 109). Defendant tendered proof that plaintiff did 
not hesitate to answer or to refuse to answer questions, 
and that in refusing to answer questions plaintiff made 
remarks which indicated that he was not frightened nor 
intimidated; for example he said, "I won't waste any 
time-unnecessary questions." (R. 1501. Ab. 183-184). 
The trial judge said: "As I understood Mr. Chambers' 
testimony, he claimed statements in his testimony were 
made under the influenc of a threat. Now it appears 
that the threat was not made during his testimony~ but 
after his testimony was concluded.n (R. 1507. Ab. 184). 
The representation that he testified to a salary agree-
ment of $400 for Sims and $350 for himself under the 
influence of a "threat" was palpably false, and destroyed 
his credibility. 
Paragraph XIII of the Certificate of Limited 
Partnership specifies that Sims and Chambers were 
then "equal partners." As stated in Baston v. Drum-
mond~ (Ark.), 249 S.W. 547: 
"In the absence of any contract on the subject, 
neither partner would be entitled to charge any-
thing by way of salary for his services; but if 
they were to be paid, and there was no express 
contract in regard to the sum to be paid, the pre-
sumption would be that they were to receive the 
same payment, as they ·were equal partners ... " 
Paragraph XIII does not relate to compensation 
for personal services, but relates to partnership "in-
terests'' and division of profits. However, on page 12 
plaintiff says that "Paragraph XIII contemplated 
that the compensation might be unequal." Such para-
graph does not so state: 
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''That the General Partners at the present time 
are equal partners and shall share equally in the 
profits; providd, that their interest shall be_ re-
adjusted as they make additional contributions 
to the partnership in property, money, or serv-
ices, or by adjustment of property values by 
mutual agreement." (Italics added.) 
Plaintiff heretofore has stated that the plaintiff 
and defendant were "treated as equal partners," and 
even alleged in the complaint that there was an equal 
division of profit "after salaries." The proof shows 
that no salaries were ever paid to either partner. Al-
though Mrs. Chambers made a number of secret entries 
in favor of her husband, she never made any entry 
which purported to show that Mr. Chambers was en-
titled to some special advantage under paragraph 
XIII. She was conscious that defendant R. W. Sims, 
not J. T. Chambers, was the partner who made sub-
stantial additional contributions. 
J. T. Chambers testified that on May 8, 1948, he 
agreed to "devote full time" to the partnership busi-
ness, whereas R. W. Sims only agreed to devote part 
time (R. 879. Ab. 102). Just how could Chambers pos-
sibly increase his full time contribution? Sims was the 
only partner who could increase his service contribu-
tion. 
In the Brief of Plaintiff there are unfounded 
remarks that Sims "left the ready mix business in 1948 
and went out to !(earns" (pages 20 and 33), and that 
"he never got back on the payroll" until 1959 (page 
18). The unwarranted inference is that defendant 
breached his agreement and ceased to perform services 
to the partnership and that he was not entitled to com-
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pensation. It was stipulated that R. W. Sims never 
violated his agreements, and that he performed services 
each and every year and the findings so indicate. (R. 279-
~80, 882, 910. A b. 10, 102, 105). Plaintiff's invalid 
argument infers that R. W. Sims as "head of the com-
pany" had to apply to Mrs. Chambers, an employee, 
to "get on the payroll." Mrs. Chambers' own testimony 
refutes plaintiff's strange argument. 
Mrs. Chambers testified that starting in July 1948 
Mr. Sims was trying to line up a big job at Kearns 
"so that we could have the concrete orders for it." (R. 
504. Ab. 52). Her testimony shows that Mr. Sims did 
not discontinue his services to the partnership "when 
he went to Kearns," but got the concrete business for 
the partnership there in 1949 and 1950. She also ad-
mitted that Mr. Sims on behalf of the partnership went 
out to various projects and took charge of pouring of 
concrete if there was any sizeable job; and if other 
problems came up which she thought were important 
they were taken up with Sims. (R. 627-628. Ab. 70). 
Plaintiff neglects to n1ention that Mrs. Chambers tes-
tified that the salary of R. W. Sims was always "fixed" 
higher than that of her husband because Sims knew 
more about the business. (R. 604-605. Ab. 65). Mrs. 
Chambers knew that because of the business ability 
of her brother, his skill and "know-how", his part-time 
services as "head of the company" were worth more 
to the partnership than the full-time services of her 
husband, who did not possess such skill and who pre-
viously had been employed as a laborer in Sims' gravel 
pit. 
Plaintiff's argun1ent overlooks the fact that not-
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withstanding the salary of Sims was always fixed higher 
than the salary of plaintiff Chambers, without authority 
Mrs. Chambers as trusted record-keeper decided to 
omit Sims' salary from the records after July 1948 
and to credit plaintiff with unauthorized figures which 
substantially included what should have been credited 
to Sims. She credited only $4,500 "salary" to Sims, 
who was entitled to the higher amount, and she credited 
$93,350 or 21 times more to her unsuspecting husband. 
Mrs. Chambers' probably did not prepare the 
memorandum in Exhibit 21-D until 1955, when she 
back-dated salaries for her husband all the way to 1949. 
Said memorandum, prepared without the knowledge 
or consent of the partners, contradicted the memo-
randum Exhibit 22-D which she prepared in May 1949 
which showed equal salaries for both general partners; 
and also a memorendum which she had in 1951 showing 
a salary of $4,778.60 for her husband which was stricken 
by agreement in March 1952. Such figure of $4,778.60 
likely included the $4,200 salary for Mr. Chambers 
which had been agreed on between the partners on May 
8, 1948. ( R. 667-668. A b. 7 4-7 5) . Those unauthorized 
manipulations which credited salary to Chambers and 
none to Sims, contradicted part of Exhibit 44-D, the 
original partnership return for the year ending Sep-
tember 30, 1949, in which no salary was shown for Mr. 
Chambers, but a salary of $2,980.18 was shown for 
R. W. Sims. That salary was eliminated by an amended 
return which stated, "This figure does not include salary 
to any partner." No "practice" by the partners which 
could modify their salary agreement was ever shown. 
Substantial additional contributions in funds to 
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the partnership were made by Sims. As shown by Ex-
hibit 5-D the contention that plaintiff left substantial 
amounts of his share of the profits in the partnership 
are grossly exaggerated. In 1950 Chambers was over-
drawn. He was overdrawn again in 1959. In contrast, 
I-t. W. Sims made very substantial contributions. He 
furnished $18,600 in 1955 and paid another $5,000 to 
the partnership in 1956. Mrs. Chambers as a salaried 
agent of Sims in his sand and gravel business from 
1947 to 1955 collected $19,293.89 owing to Sims from 
customers other than the partnership and deposited 
those funds in the partnership bank account, as shown 
in Exhibit 1-P. Between 1950 and 1952 there was a 
grand total of $33,759.20 owing to Sims from the part-
nership for sand and gravel which was not entirely paid 
until 1955. Mrs. Chambers used those funds of Mr. 
~ 
Sims as working capital in the partnership, according 
to her own testimony. (R. 976-978. Ab. 110). She 
never issued a check to either Mr. Chambers or to Mr. 
Sims at any stated interval, but upon their requests 
as they needed money. 
The contributions made by Mr. Sims after 1948 
were substantial and real. The unauthorized "salary" 
credits secretly entered on behalf of Mr. Chambers by 
his wife, did not add one cent to partnership assets nor 
pay any bills. 
There is no evidence of any modification of para-
graph XII by the partners. Plaintiff neither pleaded 
nor proved any right to preferential treatment under 
paragraph XIII; but proved that R. W. Sims was the 
only partner who made any substantial contributions 
to the partnership after May 8, 1948. 
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POINT 3. 
THE COU.RT DID NOT FIND THAT 
DEFENDANT "ACQUIESCED" IN N 0 R 
"ADOPTED" ANY OF THE UNAUTHOR-
IZED BOOKKEEPING ENTRIES MADE BY 
MRS. CHAJ.\tiBERS, AND THE EVIDENCE 
REFUTES THE CLAIM OF "ACQUIES-
CENCE" AND "ADOPTION." 
Plaintiff argues "acquiescence" in a number of 
places in his brief. Plaintiff's Point II is that "THE 
PARTIES ADOPTED THE BOOKS AND REC-
ORDS AS THEY WERE KEPT." His sub-point 
"B" is that aDefendant was amply notified of the 
salaries practices and acquiesced therein."'"' There is no 
competent proof of either ':acquiescence" or "adoption" 
of any of the bookkeeping manipulations. They were 
carried on behind the backs of the general partners and 
nondisclosure was a necessary part of the operation. 
Although Mrs. Chambers had numerous conversations 
with her brother R. W. Sims, who was the recognized 
"head of the company," at no time did she ever reveal 
to her brother what was going on behind his back. She 
even concealed her unauthorized operations from her 
husband whom she sought to unjustly enrich by the 
flagrant breach of her fiduciary duties to Sims. 
Anything Mrs. Chambers wanted her brother to 
know about, she told him, and the fact that she did not 
tell Mr. Sims what she was doing behind his back shows 
that she did not want him to kno-w. 
On page 18 of the Brief of Plaintiff it is claiined 
that the trial court made "findings that the parties 
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acquiesced in and adopted the practice of crediting the 
plaintiff with the salary for his full-time services to the 
partnership (R. 149 and 186) ". Such unfounded claims 
are argued also on pages 13, 24, 35 and mentioned on 
page 50. There was no finding of either "acquiescence" 
or "adoption." Finding of Fact No. 10 is inconsistent 
with the clai1n of "acquiescence" and it negatives the 
clai1n of "adoption," for the court found that by reason 
of the relation of confidence and trust between defend-
ant Sims and his sister Margaret Chambers a "more 
complete disclosure" was required of the salary credits 
entered in the Chambers' capital account before such 
credits could become binding on defendant. 
The very nature of that finding indicates that the 
entries complained of by defendant were unauthorized 
and not sufficiently disclosed and that Sims did not have 
adequate knowledge of them to enable him to acquiesce 
in them, and that they were therefore not binding on 
him. It was impossible to "acquiesce" in them or "adopt" 
them without full knowledge of all material facts, and 
the evidence clearly shows that Mrs. Chambers made 
no disclosure whatsoever. 
There is no plea of "acquiescence" nor of "ratifica-
tion" nor of "adoption." No such claim was asserted 
at the pretrial for the obvious reason that counsel for 
plaintiff was conscious of the fact that the Agreement 
for Dissolution of Partnership dated August 17, 1959, 
negatives the possibility of "adoption" of or "acquies-
cence" in any of the unauthorized bookkeeping entries 
and o1nissions. By said written agreement, Exhibit 
10-D, the plaintiff and defendant agreed on a tentative 
equal division of the assets of the partnership and ac-
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counts receivable, without payment of salary to either 
partner~ subject to the right of each partner to partner-
ship accounting, and the right of each party to litigate 
his disputed claims. By said written agreement executed 
by both plaintiff and defendant ""Sim,s asserts that the 
books and records of the partnership he has recently 
examined do not conform to the partnership agreement.n 
That completely refutes all of the contentions in the 
Brief of Plaintiff that defendant "acquiesced" in or 
that he "adopted" the salaries shown in the books. By 
paragraph 17 of that instrument the parties specifically 
agreed: 
"17. There are a number of items which are 
unsettled and which are presently in dispute or 
questioned by one party or the other, which remain 
to be settled by negotiation, partnership account-
ing, by court proceedings or otherwise. The un-
settled and disputed items include actual contri-
butions to capital, services rendered to the partner-
ship including claims asserted by Margaret S. 
Chambers, partnership salaries~ questions of un-
authorized salaries~ failure to accredit salaries~ 
withdrawals made by partners~ balance of capital 
accounts~ back charges on costs of materials fur-
nished by the Sims companies, claims of Thelma J. 
Sims, and alleged preferential rights to withdrawal 
of funds prior to division of remaining assets, ques-
tions of :r:ights to interest on any or all of such 
items, and other matters, including questions of 
prope1· bookkeeping and record-keeping. n (Italics 
added). 
On August 17, 1959, plaintiff in writing acknow-
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ledged that there had been no acquiescence in nor adop-
tion of the challenged bookkeeping entries, and that the 
items still in dispute included "partnership salaries, 
questions of unauthorized salaries, failure to credit 
salaries, . . . and . . . questions of proper bookkeeping 
and record-keeping." Plaintiff attempts to dispute the 
plain language of a written instrument, to which he is 
a party, by unfounded argument. 
The very nature of "acquiescence" or "ratification" 
(or "adoption") necessitates knowledge of all of the 
material facts. As stated in Holmes v. Hrobon~ (Ohio 
App.) 103 N.E. 2d 845 at 869, "acquiescence" em-
braces all elements of assent to the act or conduct 
with full knowledge, while "ratification" is confirmation 
after the act with full knowledge. Mrs. Chambers as 
well as her husband refuted his argument of "acquies-
cence" or "adoption," by the following specific admis-
sions, which also conclusively demonstrate that she acted 
without authority, secretly, contrary to the will of the 
partners, and that Sims never "acquiesced" in her 
manipulations after he found out about them, but de-
manded correction: 
She had a duty to keep correct records. ( R. 663-
664. A b. 7 4) . She knew Sim.s trusted her implicitly in 
record-keeping. (R. 700. Ab. 78). She knew book-
keeping was "way out of his line." (R. 665. Ab. 74). 
Plaintiff himself testified that he was not familiar with 
the books. He said, "That wasn't my job." (R. 914. 
Ab. 106). She was aware that Mr. Chambers testified 
that it was agreed on lVIay 8, 1948, that he would devote 
his full time to the partnership business, but that Sims 
would devote only a portion of his time. (R. 879-881. 
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Ab. 102). She knew her husband had worked as a 
laborer in the Sims gravel pit, and that R. W. Sims 
had vastly superior business ability, skill and "know-
how." Mr. Chambers testified that it was agreed that 
R. W. Sims would be considered "head of the company'' 
and that "every important decision should be referred 
to him/' (R. 886. A b. 103). She knew Sims "was the 
recognized head" of the company. (R. 623. Ab. 69). 
Mrs. Chambers admitted, '"'"We always fixed Rowe, s 
salary a little more because we figured he knew more 
about that particular business than my husband did., 
(R. 604-605. Ab. 65). The term "fixed" means to "de-
cide definitely; settle, determine." Following the meet-
ing of May 8, 1948, she made some memoranda or work 
sheets "with respect to salaries of Mr. Chambers and 
Mr. Sims." (R. 606-607. Ab. 66). It would have been 
impossible to have made a memorandum on salaries of 
the two partners if those salaries had not been definitely 
established. She never had any discussion with either 
Sims or Chambers about changing those salaries. (R. 
607. Ab. 65). She destroyed the original salary memo-
randum, and made other salary memoranda which do 
not harmonize with each other, Exhibits 21-D and 22-D. 
At no time did Mr. Chambers tell her to keep a 
record of hours spent by the partners, but he refused 
to keep a record of his time. Mr. Chambers told her that 
a there wasn,t any need for either partner to keep a 
record of his time., (R. 1868. Ab. 250-251). She knew 
that neither Mr. Siins nor her husband ever authorized 
her to compute any salaries for them on an hourly basis. 
It was her decision to do so. (R. 621-622. Ab. 68). 
Sometime in 1954 or 1955 Mrs. Chambers prepared 
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the Ineinorandum in Exhibit 21-D, whereby without 
authorization of any kind she attempted to put a salary 
for her husband on an hourly basis. She used in some 
places on Exhibit 21-D the same hourly rate for both 
her husband and Mr. Sims. After the name of Sims, 
instead of putting an amount, she put a question mark. 
(R. 621. Ab. 68). Without mentioning anything to 
either partner, she and Russell Evans decided to omit 
any salary for Mr. Sims on the records for the period 
following July 1948. (R. 703. Ab. 80). Regardless of 
the services she knew Mr. Sims performed, she made 
no entry as salary for him after July 1948. (R. 623. 
A b. 69) . She knew that a "salary" of $4,778.60 for 
Mr. Chambers for 1951 had been stricken by agreement 
when Mr. Sims found out about it; but some months 
later or several years later she secretly put a salary 
of $7,200 in the Chambers memorandum account and 
back-dated it to 1951, without saying anything to any 
person. (R. 654-658, 702. A b. 72-73, 79-80). 
Mrs. Chambers blamed Russell Evans for the 
salary entries of $11,700 in 1955 in favor of Cha1nbers, 
but she never told Mr. Sims about them. (R. 701-702, 
708-710, 714, 715, Ab. 79-81). Successive entries were 
made without consulting either Mr. Sims or her hus-
band. (R. 715. Ab. 81). She knew uthese entries had 
gone on for a period of years before there was any dis-
covery made of those entries.n (R. 721. Ab. 83). She 
said that when l\t1r. Sims found out about those entries 
for her husband and lack of entries for Sims, Mr. Sims 
became very angry. (R. 715. Ab. 82). When Sims 
learned of the bookkeeping irregularities in October 
1958, he demanded correction of the records. Instead 
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of making correction, behind his back she made another 
entry of $11,700 for her husband for December 31, 
1958. 
Mrs. Chambers testified that salary entries were 
made once each year, at "income tax time." She ex-
plained, al would discuss it with Mr. Evans and then 
forget it.n (R. 835. Ab. 97). She not only forgot to 
tell her brother about such unconscionable activities, 
but she even forgot to tell her husband. After Sims in 
October 1958 found out about the shocking bookkeeping 
irregularities, he asked her whether "Tal knew anything 
about those salary entries on the books," and she told 
Sims that she did not think her husband knew about 
them. She said that "Tal had never had a check to know 
he was getting a salary." (R. 826. Ab. 95-96). Mr. 
Chambers was then asked a day or two later as to his 
recollection of salaries. He told Sims, "My salary was 
less than Leonard's and your salary was more than 
Leonard's, and the figures that I have in my mind are 
$350 a month for me and $400 a month for you." There 
never was any discussion between the partners about 
changing salaries. (R. 1052-1053. Ab. 123-12~). 
At first Mr. Chambers disclanned any responsi.,. 
bility for the unauthorized entries. As late as July 
1959 he said he told Mr. Sims that prior to that time he 
did not know that he had ever been credited with any 
salary on the books, and he told Mr. Sims he did not 
know what the entries were. (R. 922-923. Ab. 107). 
As proof positive that Mr. Sims did not "adopt the 
books and records as they were kept" by Mrs. Cha1nbers, 
after Sims as "head of the company" failed in his efforts 
to obtain correction by Mrs. Chambers, who had an 
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admitted duty to keep correct records, Mr. Sims ap-
pealed to his co-partner John T. Chambers for cor-
rection of the records in July 1959. Mr. Chambers 
testified that at that time he told Mr. Sims he '"'"was not 
going to stand for any changes in the books because it 
reflected on Margarefs honesty.-'-' (R. 922. Ab. 107). 
Plaintiff's attempt to take advantage of his wife's 
unauthorized bookkeeping entries and manipulations, 
made it impossible for defendant to continue in business 
with plaintiff. Under their Agreement for Dissolution 
of Partnership dated August 17, 1959, Exhibit 10-D, 
none of the unauthorized salary entries were paid, and 
the parties agreed tha t"Sims asserts that the books and 
records of the partnership ... do not conform to the 
partnership agreement." That document shatters the 
claim of "acquiescence" and "adoption." 
POINT 4. 
"ACQUIESCENCE" OR "ADOPTION" 
COULD NOT ARISE FROM DISCUSSIONS 
OF NON- SALARY ITEMS, NOR F R 0 M 
STATEMENTS WHICH OMITTED ALL REF-
ERENCE TO SALARIES, NOR FROM ANY 
ALLEGED "NEGLECT" OF SIMS TO EX-
AMINE RECORDS; AND THE ARGUMENT 
OF PLAINTIFF CONTRADICTS THE REC-
ORD. 
In arguing that Sims was "amply notified" of, 
and "acquiesced" in, the admittedly unauthorized con-
duct of his sister, plaintiff makes the unique contention 
that failure of Sims to find out what was going on until 
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the fall of 1958 was due to his own "neglect" to examine 
records "always available to him." Plaintiff attempts 
to shift the blame onto defendant, and thereby divert 
attention from Mrs. Chambers' flagrant breaches of 
her fiduciary duties to Sims, and also to obscure plain-
tiff's inequitable conduct as a partner in 1959 in trying 
to take advantage of his wife's undisclosed prejudicial 
conduct. 
Just how available to Sims was the information 
of what was going on behind his back? Some partner-
ships records were at the office, some in a file, some in 
a desk drawer, and some were even in a box in the deep 
freeze. ( R. 806. A b. 92) . Notwithstanding Exhibit 
10-D dated August 17, 1959, required Mrs. Chambers 
to deliver all of the partnership records to Sims by 
September 15, 1959, she admitted that in July 1959 
she removed some documents from the partnership 
records and they were kept in either her possession or 
in the custoq.y of her attorney. She said she knew that 
in 1959 Mr. Sims was anxious to get all of the partner-
ship records, and her own ad.Inissions show that she 
frustrated him with respect to at least some of them. 
(R. 581-584, 587. Ab. 61-62). That shows she did not 
want Mr. Sims to have access to some of them at least. 
On April 18, 1961, after defendant had made an addi-
tional demand for surrender of the partnership docu-
ments, Mr. Bird delivered 13 certificates of title (offered 
by defendant as Exhibit 92-D). Mr. Bird offered the 
following excuse for his clients: ""\'V e have a lot of files 
in our place of business. In our opinion we have dis-
gorged all from our files that defendant is entitled to." 
He then offered to allow Mr. Evans to look at those 
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files, but refused to permit either Mr. Sims or his ac-
countant or his attorney to do so. (R. 1843-1844. Ab. 
243-244). 
If Mrs. Chambers forgot about the records she 
put in the deep freeze, how would Mr. Sims know where 
to look, particularly when he was unfamiliar with the 
records? Mrs. Chambers breached her fiduciary duties 
to her brother to keep him properly informed, by re-
fraining from disclosing what she had done. 
Since the unauthorized entries were not made until 
1955, even if Mr. Sims had actually examined the rec-
ords prior to 1955 he could not have found any of the 
entries which now appear for the years 1949 to 1954, 
for they were backdated. Exhibit 22-D made in May 
1949 showing an equal salary for both partners, is 
inconsistent with Exhibit 21-D which Mrs. Chambers 
made about 1955 when she decided to "compute" part-
ners' salaries on an "hourly basis", and omit all salary 
for her brother for the period following July 1948. 
Exhibit 21-D was found among some miscellaneous 
papers, about one month before trial. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's attempts to charge Mr. 
Sims with the duty of finding out about the bookkeeping 
manipulations without any one telling him, Mrs. Cham-
bers herself, who was responsible for keeping accurate 
records, at first disclaimed any responsibility for the 
salary entries of $11,700 made in favor of Mr. Chambers 
from and after 1955. She blamed Russell Evans, and 
Evans blamed her. She testified, "I didn't know about 
any of these items until this controversy arose, because 
I argued so strenuously about it and I thought there 
would probably be a change made." (R. 783. Ab. 90). 
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She said she made a notation of "wrong" in the ledger 
which she later erased. (R. 786. Ab. 90). How could 
she have made such a notation or have argued strenu-
ously about it, if she did not know 1 Although she said 
she thought there would be a "change made," she did 
not make any strenuous efforts to correct the records 
or any efforts to notify Mr. Sims about such wrongful 
entries. 
A classic example of the unfounded attempt of 
plaintiff to claim that Mr. Sims knew about the book-
keeping irregularities for a long time, appears on pages 
25 and 26 of the Brief of Plaintiff, wherein plaintiff 
infers that Robert E. Shirley, a C.P.A., in 1956 "dis-
cussed appropriate matters with Mr. Sims_, including 
salaries. (Ab. 41-44, R. 439-44, 447, 453, 461, 465). 
Although, when he was pressed to recall a specific con-
versation in which salaries was specifically discussed, 
he was unable to do so (Ab. 45, R. 465) ." Page 45 of 
the Abstract shows that Mr. Shirley's testimony refutes 
the claims of plaintiff: 
"I cannot state definitely what I showed Mr. 
Reimann at his home other than the letter (Ex-
hibit 12-P). I knew that ~Ir. Reimann was 
making inquiry as counsel for Mr. Sin1s. (R. 
467). 
"I recall saying that Tal Chambers had left 
a portion of his share of the profits in the business 
and had not drawn out all of his share of the 
profits and there would have to be some adjust-
Inents by reason of that. The subject of salaries 
was never discussed at the meeting betzt'een Mr. 
Reimann and me. (R. 464). I don"'t 1·emember 
w~eth:r the subje~t of salaries was ever discussed 
with either Mr. Sims or Mr. Reimann. 
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"I do not recall a specific conversation in which 
salaries to Mr. Chambers was discussed. That is 
what I would like to have the record show. (R. 
465). 
"When I said I discussed income with Mr. 
Sims I refer to the fact that I told him what the 
figure was as to his share of the income. I don"'t 
have any recollection that I exhibited any part-
nership return to him.-'"' (R. 466). 
Mr. Shirley was called as a witness for plaintiff 
and cross-defendant. He admitted that he knew Mr. 
Sims was "not familiar with bookkeeping entries or 
bookkeeping methods." (R. 468. Ab. 46). Mr. Shirley 
was hired by Ray Liljenquist in 1956 to make an exami-
nation of the partnership records for Mr. Liljenquist 
as a prospective purchaser of partnership assets. (R. 
413. Ab. 36). Mr. Shirley expressly stated that he never 
informed either defendant or his attorney of any book-
keeping irregularities. He had a conversation with Mr. 
Reimann as attorney for Mr. Sims on March 16, 1956. 
Mr. Shirley said he told Mr. Reimann athat it was 
pretty hard to find things on the books the way the rec-
ords are kept."'"' Mr. Shirley further told Mr. Reimann 
that he a did not find anything irregular on the books."'"' 
(R. 446-447). Ab. 42). Just how would Mr. Sims be 
alerted to any of the irregularities by the report of such 
an investigation by a C.P.A. 1 That would be sufficient 
to lull Mr. Sims into a sense of security since he had 
implicit trust and confidence in his sister. Since it was 
"pretty hard" for even a C.P.A. to "find things on the 
books the way the records are kept", just how much 
chance would a person like Mr. Sims who was unskilled 
in bookkeeping have to find anything? Mr. Shirley did 
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not disclose to either Mr. Sims or his attorney that he 
had made no inquiry to ascertain whether proper entries 
had been made in the ledger. (R. 445. Ab. 42) · 
The J. T. Chambers memorandum capital account 
appears in about the middle of the ledger, Exhibit 1-P. 
It appears under the tab, "Proprietorships." There is 
no tab on "Salaries." There is no index nor any chart 
of accounts in the ledger. An inexperienced person 
unfamiliar with bookkeeping, particularly the hybrid 
system used by Mrs. Chambers, would have a hard 
time to stumble onto the sheet where the unauthorized 
entries appeared. That sheet had a "semi-honorable 
burial" in a mislabeled part of the ledger. If a person 
started at the beginning of the ledger he would become 
so confused and discouraged that he likely never would 
reach the middle. When these facts were brought out 
in the testimony of Glendon E. Steiner, Sr., Mr. Bird 
himself proceeded to cinch the point by the following 
explanation concerning the ledger, Exhibit 1-P: 
"MR. BIRD: This book is not made for any 
ordinary layman to examine. * * * This is an ac-
countant's record, a bookkeeper's record and made 
for his use. If anybody examining his books can't 
find anything, he can ask the bookkeeper. It isn't 
intended that anyone who walks in can pick up a 
set of books and find what he is looking for with-
out help." (R. 1284. Ab. 153). 
At pages 26 to 28 plaintiff argues that discussion 
between Sims and his sister in March 1956 shows that 
he was aware of what was on the books. The discussion 
related to a proposed sale which never materialized. 
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Mr. Bird so admitted. (R. 534. Ab. 57). The entire 
conversation was incompetent. It related to how the 
assets would be divided in the event of a proposed sale. 
Exhibits 16-P and 17-P were incompetent. Exhibit 
17-P was altered out of the presence of defendant. 
Salaries were not mentioned in the negotiations ac-
cording to Mrs. Chambers' own admissions. Mrs. Cham-
bers represented to her brother that the figure of 
$56,856.15, which appears on Exhibit 17-P, was the 
difference between the plaintiff's capital account and 
Sims' capital account at that time. Mrs. Chambers was 
very careful not to show Mr. Sims those capital ac-
counts, but tried to get him into an agreement on the 
division of the assets. She falsely represented that Mr. 
Sims had "overdrawn" his account. She knew the books 
did not show Mr. Sims overdrawn, and Mr. Bird said, 
"We will stipulate that the books don't show that." Mr. 
Bird said, "Apparently they do not show any overdraft 
at any time." (R. 729,731-732. Ab. 84). Mrs. Chambers 
first testified that she told her brother that "I couldn't 
see why it should be so different, only that our salaries 
and our profits had been plowed back into the company 
whereas he had been having to take his for expansion 
of his pit operation." (R. 519. A b. 54). On cross exami-
nation when asked about her statement made on direct 
examination about "salary" she said, "I don't know 
that the word 'salaries' should be in there." (R. 729. 
Ab. 84). Her own qualification of her testimony shows 
that she did not discuss salaries with her brother during 
that negotiation on a sale proposal. Furthermore, not-
withstanding the efforts of Mr. Bird to contradict the 
record, Mr. Sims testified that the words "wages M. & 
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T." opposite the figure of $56,856.15 were not put on 
Exhibit 17-P during that conversation nor in his pres-
ence. Sims testified that she told him that "Tal's portion 
of the profits and her wages were plowed back into the 
business, and that made that difference between us." 
(R. 1080-1081. Ab. 128). Mr. Bird cut off further 
interrogation as to the alteration of Exhibit 17-P out 
of the presence of Mr. Sims by stating that Mrs. Cham-
bers put those words "wages M. & T." on later. (R. 
1081. Ab. 128). 
Counsel for plaintiff refers to a number of docu-
ments which were prepared by Mrs. Chambers, Mr; 
Evans, Mr. Beal and others. Contrary to the record he 
claims that those documents were either delivered to 
Mr. Sims or exhibited to him. On page 26 he refers to 
Exhibit 15-P which was a statement prepared for Mr. 
Chambers, but never exhibited to Mr. Sims. Such 
statement contradicts the records. Said statement is 
utterly ridiculous for it shows distribution of all profit 
for 1950 to 1952 to Mr. Chambers, including the amount 
on Exhibit 23-D which was owing to ~Ir. Sims for sand 
and gravel. 1\'Irs. Chambers said she did not know if 
she had Exhibit 15-P with her when she talked to Mr. 
Sims. (R. 520. Ab. 55). 
On page 28 plaintiff argues that Exhibit 18-P "was 
another annual statement which was presumably de-
livered to Mr. Sims since that was the purpose of pre-
paring them, according to Mr. Evans (A b. 17 5, R. 
1437) ." Contrary to such assertion ~Ir. Evans said he 
had no recollection that any copy was ever forwarded to 
Mr. Sims. (R. 1437. Ab. 175). Mr. Sims never received 
such document. It never could have been prepared for 
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~Ir. Sims, for it disputes not only the figures Mrs. 
Chambers had put in the ledger in 1955 and backdated 
to 1949 to 1951, but it also contradicts the statement 
attached to the partnership tax return for the period in 
question in Exhibit 44-D. It could not have been a 
statement for an original partnership return, for the 
original return for the period ending September 30, 
1949, showed a salary of $2,980.18 for R. W. Sims and 
none for J. T. Chambers. Such return was later amended 
to show no salary for either partner, with the following 
notation: "This figure does not include salary to any 
partner." (See Exhibit 44-D). It is significant that 
Exhibit 18-P was not in the partnership records, but 
in the possession of Mrs. Chambers. 
On page 28 plaintiff argues that Exhibit 21-D 
"ties in with the conversations that all of the parties 
and Mr. Reimann had with Mr. Beckstrom (Ab. 121 
and 136, R. 1039 and 1132) .'' There were no conver-
sations stating thatJ. T. Chambers should receive a 
salary and Sims should be denied a salary. Mr. Beck-
strom prepared a form of capital account which Mrs. 
Chambers admits is attached in Exhibit 21-D. The 
Beckstrom capital account did not include a salary 
to either partner. As shown by Exhibit 21-D which 
was secretly made in 1955 without any authority, Mrs. 
Chambers devised salary figures for her husband for 
periods of 1949 to 1954 and back-dated them to the 
years in question, and she even computed a "salary" 
for her husband on an "hourly basis" when she knew 
her husband had refused to keep a record of his time 
and had told her it was not necessary for either partner 
to keep any record of his time. On Exhibit 21-D yellow 
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memorandum sheets Mrs. Chambers based an inflated 
salary for her husband in part on "overseeing" the Sims 
gravel pit, which could not be chargeable to the partner-
ship-a service which Chambers himself denied that he 
ever rendered. 
On page 29 plaintiff contradicts the record by 
saying that "This testimony indicates that the whole 
method of keeping the capital accounts was discussed 
with the defendant in connection with 21-D and his 
suggestion was carried out." There never was any dis-
cussion about Exhibit 21-D for l\1r. Sims never saw it 
until a month before the trial, and Mrs. Chambers her-
self repeatedly admitted that she did not discuss any 
of those "salary items" with Mr. Sims. Plaintiff con-
tradicts the testimony of his wife. Plaintiff also said 
that "Exhibit 23-D reflects this", when it is utterly 
inconsistent with Exhibit 23-D. Plaintiff then contends: 
"It is significant that on this tax return when first pre-
pared there was a salary only for John T. Chambers 
and in the amount of $4,778.60 for the year 1951." It 
certainly is significant, for that figure does not agree 
with any figure in the ledger. :Furthermore, although 
that figure was stricken by agreement of the parties 
after Mr. Sims and his attorney learned about it, so that 
no salary was shown for J. T. Cha1nbers for 1951, some 
months later or several years later in defiance of that 
agreement Mrs. Chambers had a new "salary" of 
$7,200.00 secretly entered and back-dated to 1951, 
which was $2,421.40 in excess of the figure which had 
been stricken by agreement made on March 14, 1952. 
At the trial counsel for plaintiff said, "We will stipulate 
that neither of them knew about it at the time." (R. 
1047. Ab. 122). 
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Exhibit 26-P was prepared behind the back of R. 
W. Sims after an adjustment of $11,722.93 in his favor 
in the price of sand and gravel had been agreed on 
between Sims and the Chambers. Exhibit 26-P was 
incompetent. Contrary to the argument of plaintiff on 
page 29 there was no agreement to deduct $2,500 or 
any other sum from that settlement figure. Instead of 
entering the $11,722.93 in the records as the argreement 
required, as soon as Sims' back was turned, Mrs. Cham-
bers had only $9,196.97 entered as owing for sand and 
gravel. There was deducted an amount in excess of 
$2,500 without authorization and $2,500 was falsely 
noted on the records as "salary". Mr. Evans, who made 
the entries under the supervision of Mrs. Chambers, did 
not testify that Mr. Sims had anything to do with such 
abortive exhibit. He admitted that the "item of $2,500 
represents the adjustment made in the price of sand 
and gravel. It was not really a salary at all." (R. 1453. 
Ab. 176). There was no excuse fDr such bookkeeping 
manipulation. If it had been salary it would have been 
a charge against the partnership, and not a charge 
against R. W. Sims nor against his sand and gravel 
account. Mrs. Chambers tried to shift the blame onto 
Mr. Evans. (R. 816. R. 93). No wonder the court ex-
claimed: "Well, it is beyond the understanding of the 
court." (R. 1455. A b. 177). Mr. Bird offered the un-
tenable excuse that "it took the form of salary as a 
means of making the sand and gravel adjustment." 
There was no occasion to resort to some bookkeeping 
1nanipulation after the figure of $11,722.93 had been 
agreed on as the amount owing to Sims. The correct 
figure should have been entered in the books. 
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On page 25 plaintiff argues that defendant re-
ceived copies of the annual statements, Exhibit 6-P. 
Not even Mrs. Chambers claimed he did. None of those 
annual statements shows a salary to Mr. Chambers, 
and only two of them refer to "capital a~counts." Mr. 
Sims denied that he received any of them. Instead of 
testifying that those statements were delivered to Mr. 
Sims as represented in the plaintiff's brief, Mr. Evans 
testified that he did not know if copies were delivered. 
(R. 1437. Ab. 175). Exhibit 7-P contradicts Exhibit 
1-P. There was no proof of delivery of either the origi-
nal or a copy. The only statements ever delivered to 
Sims consisted of Exhibit 6-P-A, which show the 
charges made against him for checks issued to him or 
for the sand and gravel business from the partnership, 
his drawing account, and credits for the total amount 
of sand and gravel. (R. 569, ________ Ab. 61). Mrs. 
Chambers gave Mr. Sims statements in writing, Ex-
hibit 6-P-A, which did not show any salary to Mr. 
Chambers. She gave him only the information she 
wanted him to have. 
The annual profit and loss statements did not show 
any salary to either partner. Even if they had been 
delivered to Sims, which they were not, they would not 
have constituted "accounts stated", nor have been "bind-
ing" on Sims. See Caveney v. Caveney_, 234 Wis. 637, 
291 N.W. 818. Chambers could not have performed any 
service in reliance on any of the salary entries in the 
books, nor in reliance on omission of salary for Sims 
in the books; for plaintiff did not know about the un-
authorized bookkeeping activities of his wife. 
On page 20 plaintiff makes the unwarranted claim 
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that Sims "knew when he signed Exhibits 63-P and 
64-D that he had left the business and gone out to 
Kearns and that he was not going to receive any salary 
while he was there." The document was immaterial 
and irrelevant, for there is not one word which states 
that Sims had left the partnership business, nor is there 
anything mentioned about salaries of partners, nor 
anything which intimates that Sims was not to receive 
any salary while he was at Kearns, nor that Chambers 
was to receive a salary. Sims conducted business for 
the partnership at Kearns. The documents constituted 
a pledge by Sims to his sister Mrs. Margaret S. Cham-
bers of his partnership assets as sec1u·ity for a loan which 
Mrs. Chambers admittedly never consummated. Mr. 
Bird stated in arguing his motion to reopen the case to 
introduce Exhibit 63-P that "It appears on its face 
to constitute a sort of pledge. We have never regarded 
it as being an effective pledge." (R. 1656. Ab. 211). See 
the affidavit of R. W. Sims which states that Mrs. 
Chambers never completed the loan and represented 
that she returned all copies to him. (R. 132-137). Ab. 
220-225) . Mrs. Chambers testified on November 3, 
1960, that she returned the document and "never used 
it in any way against my brother." (R. 792. Ab. 212). 
Counsel for plaintiff mentions various conversa-
tions between Mr. Sims and Mrs. Chambers and be-
tween Mrs. Chambers and Mr. Sims' attorney, but 
fails to show that the subject of salaries was ever dis-
cussed, except on March 14, 1952, when it was agreed 
that the salary of $4,778.60 shown on Exhibit 23-D 
would be stricken. On page 34 plaintiff refers to a dis-
cussion at a church dinner in 1957 at which it is claimed 
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that Mrs. Chambers said the capital accounts were 
"unbalanced." lVIrs. Chambers made various excuses 
for not telling Mr. Sims about the unauthorized salary 
entries, but on this occasion she had a "captive audi-
ence" and she had every opportunity to confess to Mr. 
Sims what had been going on behind his back, but she 
again cautiously refrained from disclosing the facts 
which she had a solemn duty to disclose. 
Plaintiff has found it necessary to contradict the 
record in many instances in his unwarranted argument 
of "acquiescence." The record shows that Sims did not 
have a full knowledge of the facts essential to acquiesce 
in or adopt the wrongful manipulations made in the 
books by Mrs. Chambers. As stated in New Y ark Life 
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Kane~ 45 N.Y.S. 543, at 547, 
"acquiescence" imports active consent, and cannot be 
inferred from acts which are doubtful or ambiguous. 
Plaintiff argues that on various occasions Sims had the 
opportunity to investigate, but the fact is tha.t Mrs. 
Chambers had the fiduciary duty to disclose all impor-
tant facts to lVIr. Sims without an investigation because 
he trusted her implicitly. As soon as the plaintiff learned 
of his wife's wrongful conduct he had a fiduciary duty 
to aid his co-partner to obtain correction of the records. 
Plaintiff tried to profit from his refusal to do his duty 
to his co-partner,and to take advantage of the un-
authorized salary entries and omissions. 
POINT 5. 
CONTRARY TO ARGUMENTS OF PLAIN-
TIFF, "REASONABLENESS" 'VAS NOT A 
PROPER ISSUE, BUT IT WAS THE UN-
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FOUNDED PREMISE F 0 R CANCELING 
THE CONTRACTS JVIADE BY THE PARTIES 
AND SUBSTITUTION OF A PURPORTED 
"IMPLIED AGREEMENT" CREATED BY 
'1'1HE COURT TO WHICH THERE NEVER 
WAS ANY ASSENT . 
On page 39 of his brief plaintiff states that "it was 
error for the court to consider further evidence on the 
issue of reasonableness," but then proceeds to attempt 
to uphold the admitted error. Plaintiff says, a1 t was 
within the pleadings and Pre-Trial Order/J but there 
never was any such pleading and nothing was stated 
in the pre-trial order. On page 42 plaintiff· refers to 
the balance sheet figure which was taken from Exhibit 
3-P. One look at that clearly indicates that the question 
of reasonableness was not involved for each party 
claimed specific salaries in specific amounts. As stated 
by plaintiff's witness David N. Beal, Exhibit 3-P was 
made up, exhibited and used at the time of the pre-
trial conference as a "starting point." Mr. Beal said 
they "were not trying to make any determination as 
to which claim was right or which was wrong. We were 
trying to show the differences specifically where they 
were in salaries, and Exhibit 3-P illustrates thos'e differ-
ences." That exhibit was made as a result of a confer-
ence between Mr. Beal as accountant for plaintiff 
and Glendon E. Steiner as accountant for the 
defendant. (R. 1893-1894. Ab. 255-256). Thus, it is 
clear that "reasonableness" was not an issue at· the 
pre-trial and was never mentioned because the account-
ants set forth the specific salary claims. 
Plaintiff says that uDe.fendant suggested at the 
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opening of the trial that it be eliminated."'"' Defendant 
contended all along that "reasonableness" was not an 
issue. After the court said to Mr. Bird that he under-
stood "from your statement now that reasonableness of 
services will not enter into the lawsuit" (R. 289, Ab. 
14), Mr. Burton pointedly asked: 
" ... is it Mr. Bird's contention that the prac-
tice on which he said he is relying is one that 
the parties have by some practice established an 
agreement that there will be a reasonable amount 
allowed for services 1 
"MR. BIRD: Oh, no, no." (R. 290-291. Ab. 
14.) 
The court said that Mr. Bird was going to show 
"that there was a practice and that practice established 
a specific salary and that the matter of reasonableness 
is not an issue in the case."'"' (R. 292, Ab. 15). 
Under sub point "C" plaintiff argues '"'"The possi-
bility that both might fail in their claims of specific 
compensation 'Was recognized."'"' Plaintiff says, "Both 
parties expected to succeed in establishing their claimed 
specific salaries." If the court was right in ruling that 
neither party proved his claim of a specific salary agree-
ment, under the statute neither party became entitled 
to a salary and the judgment should be reversed and 
judgment should be entered in favor of defendant 
against plaintiff and his wife because the Chambers were 
overdrawn. The trial court held that both plaintiff and 
defendant failed to prove an agreement for specific 
salaries. Both partners performed personal services, 
but the trial court could not entertain any evidence 
that the services of one partner were of greater value 
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than the services of the other partner. Instead of deny-
ing salary to each partner as such determination would 
require, the court decided that the plaintiff should 
have "reasonable compensation" for his services and 
defendant should be "denied compensation" for his 
services. The court thus struck down the agreements 
which the partners made and substituted one which was 
utterly inconsistent with the claims of either party for 
which there never was any assent or consideration. 
On page 45 to 48 plaintiff makes the contention 
that aThe Court had the right to hear the further issue 
and complete the case.n Plaintiff infers that the oourt 
could create an issue which was inconsistent with the 
theories of both parties and give the plaintiff another 
"day in court" while denying defendant the same privi-
lege. Contrary to the argument of plaintiff the Rules 
of Civil Procedure do not "encourage the District Cou):"t 
to do what was done in this case." The cited rules do 
not declare that after a plaintiff has failed in his proof 
that he should be permitted to have a new trial on an 
entirely inconsistent theory. None of the rules give the 
courts authority to cancel a contract made by the parties 
and to substitute sorne "'"implied agreement~ which is 
utterly inconsistent with the claims of both parties. 
Plaintiff then says that "'1f reasonableness was a 
proper issue~ the Courfs decision was supported by evi-
dence and is sound.n It was not a proper issue, and there 
was no competent evidence and the decision is inequit-
able. Plaintiff then disregards just about everything in 
the Brief of Defendant andAppellant by saying that de-
fendant "makes no attack on the Findings of Fact 
relative to reasonableness of the salary awarded to the 
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plaintiff." Plaintiff overlooks defendant's brief, and 
particularly pages 37, and 40 to 44. 
The court actually dispensed with any proof of 
"reasonable" compensation for 1949 to 1951 and gen-
erously allowed plaintiff the full amount of those un-
authorized back-dated salary entries, although there 
were partnership losses and no profits. On April 18, 
1961, the trial judge said: 
"I intend to adopt the salaries claimed through 
1951, and from there on out, it is necessary for 
me to find what is a reasonable amount of com-
pensation under the circumstances." (R. 1842. 
Ab. 243). 
There is not even a finding of "reasonableness" 
for 1949 to 1951. There was no competent proof offered 
by plaintiff of "reasonable compensation" for the years 
1952 to 1959 and plaintiff points to none. The trial 
court at the request of plaintiff used the hourly rate 
for the man at Magna who was classified as an "operat-
ing engineer," without proof of comparable activities. 
Although plaintiff testified to "long hours," he admitted 
that he had an agreement with Sims on May 8, 1948, 
that he would devote "full time" to the business while 
Sims, who was made "head of the company," was only 
required to devote a portion of his time. Plaintiff ad-
mitted that he spent part of his time at Smith's Inn, 
and that he claimed "reasonable compensation" for the 
time he spent there. (R. 1855-1856. Ab. 247). He neve1· 
made any record of his time because he told Mrs. 
Chambers that there "wasn't any need for either partner 
to keep a record of his time." (R. 1868. Ab. 251). l\Irs. 
Chambers adrnitted that she testified on deposition thai 
she personally knew that Mr. Chambers went to Smith's 
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Inn quite a few times during the day for coffee breaks, 
and that she told him to go there. She said he would 
state, "I'm going to the corner. If anything comes up, 
call me there." She said, "'"And he practically had a pri-
vale line to Smith"s.n (R. 2206-2207. Ab. 297). 
The evidence showed that everything which Mr. 
Chambers testified he did could be done in 4Vz to 5 
hours in the summer and about 2 hours in the winter, 
by persons without previous experience. Mr. Chambers 
had an extra man with him in the hatching plant. The 
business operated just as well when Mr. Chambers was 
away as when he was there, and after dissolution of 
the partnership a reduced portion of the business at 
th eHolladay plant operated at less cost per concrete 
yard. (R. 1899-1953. Ab. 257-266). Mr. Evans, who 
testified for plaintiff, indicated Mr. Chambers spent a 
lot of time needlessly, and that the business sometimes 
operated better when he was away. (R. 205.9-2061. Ab. 
277). 
When there was a cement shortage from trucks 
hauling in cement, Mr. Sims endeavored to get the evi-
dence of short-weights. Mr. Chambers agreed to have 
all trucks weighed after Mr. Sims had the new scales 
installed. Mr. Chambers w·eighed only 12 loads, 10 of 
which had a shortage, but he falsely reported to counsel 
for Mr. Sims that there was no shortage. Th~re w:as a 
shortage of 2,900 pounds in the 10 loads as shown in 
Exhibit 75-D. (R. 2133-2140, 2261-2266. Ab. 285-286, 
308). The partnership suffered a loss of approximately 
$28,000 over a period of years through the indifference 
of Chambers and his false representations· to his co-
partner. 
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Sims rescued the partnership from some of th 
financial problems which Mr. Chambers created b; 
breach of his agreement with his co-partner. Sims wa 
instrumental in having his attorneys settle a $45,001 
controversy over cement shortages and alleged unpai< 
accounts, without paying any part of the dispute< 
$25,000 claim of a cement company. See Exhibit 81-P 
Sims saved the partnership thousands of dollars whicl 
Mr. and Mrs. Chambers wanted paid on an unjust claim 
Sims as "head of the company" never neglected tc 
perform his agreements. It was stipulated that he neve1 
breached his partnership agreements. There was m 
equitable basis for cancelation of any contract with hi~ 
co-partner or the substitution by the court of an in· 
consistent "implied agreement" to favor Chambers witb 
"reasonable compensation" in the aggregate amouni 
of more than soro of the wrongful bookkeeping entries 
and to deny Sims any right to compensation excepi 
such amount as Mrs. Chambers as an employee acting 
without authority had secretly decided to "allow" her 
employer Sims. 
POINT 6. 
HAVING FAILED TO RENDER HIS PRE· 
TENDED "ACCOUNTING" UNTIL AFTER 
SUIT WAS FILED, PLAINTIFF CANNOT 
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY UNAUTHOR· 
IZED ENTRIES BY A PLEA OF ANY STAT· 
UTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiff cites no cases to support his plea of th~ 
statutes of limitations, nor any facts ,vhich could pos· 
sibly make any statute applicable. The rule is that tht 
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statutes of linutations do not commence to run until 
either termination of the partnership relation or the 
filing of a proper partnership accounting, which plain-
tiff neglected to do. Plaintiff's pretended "accounting" 
was not even filed until several months after suit was 
filed. 
See l(imball v. McCormick~ 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 
313, Davis v. Alemander~ (Wash.), 171 P. 2d 167, and 
Reindel v. Reindel~ 253 Mich. 680, 235 N.W. 861 at 
862. 
The trial court erred in dismissing defendant's 
counterclaim, but not in ruling against plaintiff on his 
plea of the statutes of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the facts nor the law support the conten-
tions of plaintiff, nor justify the judgment entered by 
the court. The judicially created "implied agreement" 
inconsistent with the written and oral agreements of the 
partners, was prejudicial error. 
As pointed out in the Brief of Defendant and 
Appellant R. W. Sims, the judgment should be re-
versed and vacated in its entirety and defendant should 
have judgment against the plaintiff and cross-defend-
ant for their overdraft. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY and BURTON 
By WILFORD M. BURTON, and 
By PAUL E. REIMANN 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appel· 
lant R. W. Sims, No. 9554, and Re· 
spondent in No. 9556. 
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